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THE NATURAL LAW AND PRAGMATISM
In a psychological movie, to agitated quivering strings ris-
ing to clamorous brassy crescendo, we see through the eyes of
a distraught victim of psychosis the clear facade of a Gre-
cian temple quiver, blur, and then with almost unendurable
blast of trumpets and clash of cymbals turn into Gothic ca-
thedral, stream-lined office building, or hovel. Suddenly we
see reality.
So it is that many times in the history of civilization
crowds casually, inattentively passing by the temple of a
great institution or thankfully sheltered within, have been
unaware of subtle changes in the institution or the erosion of
slow but sure-footed time. Each intent on his own busy
traffic of the streets or his personal problems at the shrine of
his devotion, has failed to note any of those hairline cracks in
foundation or in pillar that are individually impotent but col-
lectively disastrous. No Samson has dramatically braced
himself between the pillars and in flagrant warning bellowed
forth his intention of destruction. At once the building, to
casual eye imperishable, collapses into ruin. Or, more likely,
as in psychotic dream or fevered vision, the beholder, as with
eyes new-opened, suddenly realizes that this which, he had
supposed to be a temple for the unified worship of a single
god had gradually become, years ago, an arena of bloody
conflict.
This, of course, is but another way of referring to the fa-
miliar time lag in social institutions and ideological struc-
tures. More specifically it refers to those subtle, generally un-
perceived-at-the-time changes in individual thought and
emotion which collectively and in retrospect visibly result in
a revolutionary change in the dominant philosophy of a
people or an age. It is renaissance, reformation, or enlight-
enment in which the leading actors play their parts more or
less consciously, perhaps with some dim adumbration of the
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end result. But for the supernumerary and acted-upon
masses there is no pace perceived.
Ours is the task with humility but with courage, by the
grace of God to help give the people the vision without which
they perish. That vision must begin with a clear-eyed ap-
praisal and a close scrutiny of the present house of the law.
We must test its foundations and scan its supporting pillars.
And we must consider the effect of its environment upon the
stability of the structure and upon the people seeking shelter
within its walls. We must consider the law in its relations
to all the thought and feeling of the time.
For isolationism in thought is, of course, impossible. And
whether the law be product -of reason or emotion or of both in
infinitely varying proportions, the pretensions of Austinian
jurisprudence to be self-sufficient could not stand -in the face
of the development of the social sciences in the last one hun-
dred years. And so we go back a century.
Absolute truth existing and approachable by human rea-
son, if not always unerringly attainable, natural law as the
measure of positive law, unalienable rights; these represented
the philosophic teaching of American universities and col-
leges until well into the nineteenth century. These were the
convictions of the Founding Fathers. So it was that Ham-
ilton, with the perennial exuberant confidence of youth, wrote
that "the sacred rights of mankind... written in the whole
volume of human nature by the hand of Divinity itself...
can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." But let
us trace the obscurement if not the erasure.
Let us turn to the second administration of Andrew Jack-
son, the embodiment of the American frontier and see
whether a change had not become apparent. For in 1835 de
Tocqueville opened the second part of his Democracy in
America with the words: "I think that in no country in the
civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the
United States. The Americans have no philosophical school
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of their own, and they care but little for all the schools into
which Europe is divided, the very names of which are scarce-
ly known to them."
Perhaps we may go beyond de Tocqueville's 1835 and take
1859 as the year of beginning. For that year saw the publi-
cation of Darwin's Origin of Species and saw but did not per-
ceive the birth in far-away Vermont of John Dewey. Of
Darwin we shall speak later. Of Dewey today we find such
statements as these: "Dewey is the spokesman of our age."
(James Harvey Robinson) "He is the most influential think-
er of the past two or three generations." (Sidney Ratner)
"He is the most profound and understanding thinker on edu-
cation that the world has yet known." (Ernest C. Moore)
"In the profoundest sense Dewey is the philosopher of Amer-
ica." (Herbert W. Schneider) "John Dewey is the domi-
nant figure in American philosophy today. A host of dis-
ciples look upon him as the great intellectual liberator of our
times .... It is largely as a result of, his analysis that the
greater part of traditional philosophy is finally revealed as
an elaborate art of self-deception-a quest for an illusory
goal."
And finally, to make an end of it, we quote Sidney Hook
who begins his book in honor of Dewey: "The philosophy of
John Dewey represents a distinctive contribution to the
thought of the modern age. He has carried to completion a
movement of ideas which marks the final break with the an-
cient and medieval outlook upon the world. In his doctrine
the experimental temper comes to self-consciousness. A new
way of life is proposed to realize the promise of our vast ma-
terial culture. Organized intelligence is to take the place of
myth and dogma in improving the common lot and enriching
individual experience."
But before we consider the sweep of Dewey's influence
and that of pragmatism let us recall the familiar story of the
origin and chief points of development of that school of
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thought. Then we shall attempt to sketch the reasons for
its wide reception and profound influence.
The particular philosophy, taught or dominant in sdhool
or college among any people at any time, is of course of pri-
mary importance. And even the thought of a contemporan-
eously unknown or long-forgotten scholar, if seminally po-
tent can be overlooked or ignored only at peril to the com-
mon good. For it may germinate and capture the minds of
dominant philosophers in the schools. From thence it may
sally forth in the hands of philosophers amateur and profes-
sional, enthusiastic popularizers and preachers, ecclesiastical
and lay, to become the dominant philosophy of a dominant
democratic majority in a vast continental democracy of
140,000,000 souls dominating or semi-dominating the mod-
ern world.
In 1878 Charles S. Peirce published in Popular Science
Monthly his then generally unnoticed but now famous article
entitled How to Make Our Ideas Clear. As a laboratory sci-
entist his purpose was-to use his words-to apply "the
fruitful methods of science" to "the barren field of meta-
physics." The a priori method for fixing belief makes a
thing true when it is agreeable to reason. But this sort of
truth, said Peirce, varies between persons. For what is agree-
able to reason is more or less a matter of taste. Parenthetic-
ally we may note here what we shall later have occasion to
suggest, namely the pragmatist distrust of metaphysics and
its generally anti-intellectualist or anti-rational spirit. The
method of science, said Peirce, avoids the variances of in-
dividual opinion. The heart of his doctrine is in these words:
"The action of thought is excited by the irritation of a doubt
and ceases when belief is attained; so that the production of
belief is the sole function of thought .... To develop a mean-
ing we have simply to determine what habit it produces....
We come down to what is tangible and practical as the root
of every distinction of thought.., and there is no distinction
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so fine as to consist of anything but a possible difference in
practice."
Peirce's doctrine slumbered for twenty years. And then
in 1898 came forth its great apostle and champion William
James. It was he, of course, who was to elaborate the doc-
trine into a full-blown theory of truth and give it wide cur-
rency by an emotional drive and an ingratiatingly popular
style. The drive and style were suggestive of the manner in
which Justice Holmes was to win converts to the same cause
in the field of law. In 1904 in the first volume of the Journal
of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods James
said: "Suppose that there are two different philosophical defi-
nitions, or propositiofis, or maxims, or what not, which seem
to contradict each other and about which men, dispute. If,
by assuming the truth of the one, you can foresee no prac-
tical consequence to anybody, at any time or place, which is
different from what you would foresee if you assumed the
truth of the other, why then the difference between the two
propositions is no real difference-it is only a specious and
verbal difference, unworthy of future contention. . . . There
can be no difference which does not make a difference-no
difference in the abstract truth which does not express itself
in a difference of concrete fact, and of conduct consequent
upon that fact, imposed upon somebody, somehow, some-
where, and somewhen."
In 1907 in his Lowell lectures, referring approvingly to
Dewey and to Schiller, James used the now familiar words:
that truth "means nothing but this, that ideas (which them-
selves are but parts of our experience) become true just
insofar as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with
other parts of our experience. ... Any idea upon which we
can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperous-
ly from one part of our experience to another part, linking
things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving
labor, is true for just so much, true insofar forth, true instru-
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
mentally. This is the 'instrumental' view of truth ... the
view that truth in our ideas means their power to 'work' ....
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corro-
borate, and verify. False ideas are those that we can not
.... This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by
an idea's verification. You can say of (a truth) either that 'it
is useful because it is true', or that 'it is true because it Is
useful'. Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing,
namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be veri-
fied. True is the name for whatever starts the verification
process, useful is the name for its completed function in ex-
perience .... The true, to put it very briefly, is only the ex-
pedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only
the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in al-
most any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the
whole of course."
John Dewey was the great expositor of pragmatism in
America. His writings and those of others of the school are
so voluminous, sometimes contradictory and ambiguous, and
there are so many brands of pragmatism that it is impossible
here to do more than state briefly and without qualification
its main characteristics.
There is no absolute truth, no necessary truth. Truth is
not transcendent or eternal but only hypothetical and ambu-
latory. "There is no general truth except postulated truth
resulting from some motivated determination of the will."
More accurately speaking, there is no truth but only succes-
sive truths, accepted tentatively and provisionally if they
give promise of workability at a given time, for a given pur-
pose and in a given environment. They are true so long as
they work and no longer. They are constantly put to the
test of experience and discarded as false as soon as they cease
to work, that is to give satisfaction. Furthermore all truths
are empirical; they are made by men and they are products
of the will. As James said: "The willing department of our
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nature . . .dominates both the conceiving department and
the feeling department." Truths are instruments used by
men to adapt themselves to their environment and to change
their environment. And so too logic is identified with func-
tional psychology. Thought is valid if it serves the needs
of the organism, satisfactorily controls conduct. It is mere
illusion or verbiage to say that thought apart from function
may possess intrinsic or formal validity. Formal logic is a
farce.
The effect of willing on knowing, the subjectivism involved
in "satisfactoriness" as the test of truth, the use of logic as
a flexible tool for the achievement of purpose, the succes-
sion of variable hypothetical truths, were allied to a general
contempt for metaphysics, a distrust of principles in favor of
concrete facts, and a marked anti-intellectualism--distrust
of reason.
One of the purposes of James in proposing pragmatism
was to clear the decks of metaphysical problems and though
Dewey in recent years may have shown some turn towards
metaphysics, he has often expressed his scorn for "general
answers supposed to have a universal meaning" such as "dis-
sertations on the Family and dissertations on the sacredness
of individual personality." These, he says, "do not assist
inquiry. They close it." So, pragmatists in general have
ignored or scorned metaphysics. It is true that we must be
on guard against being content with unscrutinized abstrac-
tions as giving finality of truth or knowledge. But we can-'
not overlook the fact that for pragmatists generally the
phrases "sterile metaphysics", "barren abstractions", "empty
verbalisms" and "pernicious abstractions" have become
cliches. These are catchwords for them, as R. L. S. would
say, to "rap out upon you like an oath and by way of argu-
ment." They are to knock you down with a single blow if
you are so "naive"--to use their favorite word-as to refer
to a generalization or principle. For them these are too often
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irrelevancies or rationalizations unworthy of the intellectu-
ally sophisicated adult.
James inveighed against what he called "perverse abstrac-
tion-worship", that absolutism which he said had a certain
"sweep and dash about it", but was "remote and vacuous",
possessed of "that unreality in all rationalistic systems by
which your serious believer in facts is apt to be repelled."
"The world to which your philosophy professor introduces
you," he said, "is simple, clean, and noble .... Its architec-
ture is classic. Principles of reason trace its outlines, logical
necessities cement its parts. . . . In point of fact it is far less
an account of this actual world than a clear addition built
upon it, a classic sanctuary in which the rationalist fancy
may take refuge from the intolerably confused and gothic
character which mere facts present. It is no explanation of
our concrete universe, it is another thing altogether,a substi-
tute for it, a remedy, a way of escape." So typically prag-
matic is the Holmesian phrase of Walton Hamilton: "To my
untutored mind philosophy is an omnipresence dwelling with
the absolute in the upper stratosphere, eternally occupied
with frigid certainty."
Here are further familiar words of James: "A pragmatist
turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of in-
veterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns
away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solu-
tions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed
systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns
towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards
action and towards power .... It means the open air and
possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and pre-
tense of finality in truth .... It agrees with nominalism for
instance in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarian-
ism in emphasizing practical results; with positivism in its
disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions and metaphy-
sical abstractions."
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As Peirce said that What is agreeable to reason is-more or
less a matter of taste, so James, approaching his famous
classification of men into the tender minded and the tough,
said that the philosopher's "temperament really gives him a
stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective prem-
ises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other,
making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view
of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would." In
words echoed by Holmes and the legal realists he concludes
"the potentist of all our premises is never mentioned." And
elsewhere he declared that the history of philosophy largely
bears out the saying of an eighteenth century philosopher
that reason was given to men chiefly "to enable them to find
reasons for what they want to think and do." On this prem-
ise Dewey goes on to refer to "that dishonesty, that insincer-
ity characteristic of philosophic discussion." Salutary as
warnings may be against concealed prejudice, unconscious
bias, emotions or subconscious forces deflecting the needle of
truth from its objective goal, surely here is pragmatist attack
on reason, distrust of intellectual processes, skepticism of ar-
riving at truth. And it reminds one of the old phrase of
Cardinal Newman's about poisoning the wells of controversy.
Difficult as it is to classify the philosophy of a people, haz-
ardous the generalization, one need not be an idolater of
Dewey to say that pragmatism during the last half century
has come to represent or exp~ess dominant American thought.
If we may say with de Tocqueville that Americans have no
philosophical school of their own we may also agree with him
that "it is easy to perceive that almost all the inhabitants of
the United States conduct their understanding in the same
manner, and govern it by the same rules; that is to say, with-
out ever having taken the trouble to define the rules, they
have a philosophical method common to the whole people."
Certainly a common method governs economic and political
life, literature, the arts and sciences and secular education in
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America today. Whether as method, point of view, theory
of truth or reality, pragmatism is everywhere. The causes
for its ready and wide acceptance are not far to seek. For it
was advanced at an opportune time in a favoring environ-
ment. Its seeds fell on a congenial soil well plowed and fert-
ilized for their reception.
Reformation, Enlightenment, Cartesianism, positivism,
capitalism, the type of European so-called liberalism con-
demned in the Syllabus of Errors, the secularization of mod-
ern life and the dominance of the bourgeois mind with its ma-
terialism; all these were background and setting for Darwin's
evolutionary hypothesis with its revolutionary ramifications
in every field of thought and for the dramatic triumphs of
the physical sciences during the last one hundred years.
Evolutionary theories, widely popularized, shook the faith
of many in revealed truth who had accepted the book of
Genesis as a scientific textbook and therefore inclined or led
them to skepticism of all absolute truth. Studies of the evo-
lution of ideas and of changes in concepts of truth led to the
belief that all truth is transitory. Later the laws of nature
were regarded as themselves the product of evolution and
hence limited rather than absolute. Thought and therefore
truth were regarded as instrumental to -adaptation of the
organism to its environment and product of the will as weap-
ons in the struggle for existence. Philosophy was not a
purely objective intellectual product; it was the product of
changing folkways and the thinker's changing environment.
So for Savigny legal principles lacked temporal stability;
they changed to give expression to the changing life of the
people and the silent pressure of their desires. Institutions
evolved; truth evolved. That which was true yesterday
might not be true tomorrow. And through it all was a grow-
ing distrust of man's reason because of his supposed kinship
to the ape. And allied to this was the cult of progress.
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The cult of progress appealed to the optimism and the
self-confidence of Americans and to those who sought escape
from a rigid fatalistic determinism that was purely material-
istic. These found in evolution, especially interpreted by
John Fiske as leading from the animal to the spiritual, as
Henry Adams said, "a safe, conservative, practical, thor-
oughly common-law deity." And the struggle for existence
was admirably adapted to the individualistic laissez-faire
capitalism of the last half of the nineteenth century.
But the great idol of the age was modern, predominantly
materialistic science. Its achievements penetrated every
nook and cranny of every man's life, bringing him increased
comfort and convenience and release from irksome toil, as-
tonishing him with the corruscating successive miracles of
steam, electricity, the physical and chemical sciences and the
visible triumphs of modern engineering skills. He was
master of his environment, lord of creation. And the secret
of the genie lay in scientific methods: induction, the piling of
sensible fact upon fact, the test of thought by action, prac-
tice so startling that it obscured the theory upon which its
success was based, the use of successive hypotheses as in-
struments of scientific progress. This last was a powerful
factor in leading men to look upon all truth as tentative and
provisional, promptly to be scrapped and replaced by a newer
model the moment its practical usefulness was doubted.
Leaders of the newer social sciences looking with envious
eyes at the achievements of the physical sciences and hearing
the plaudits of the multitudes decided that they would go
and do likewise. They concentrated on facts, distrusted the-
ories and abstractions and the a priori; above all they deter-
mined to be rigidly objective and therefore to exclude all
ethical, moral, and supernatural considerations from their
studies. The quantitative approach, in later days the sta-
tistical, was favored at the expense of the qualitative. The
latter was suspected as too subjective and subject unduly to
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the personal bias of the investigator. It was believed that
somehow understanding and wisdom would emerge if you
persevered long enough in laboriously accumulating and
classifying vast quantities of carefully verified facts, though
classification was sometimes suspect since it might involve
those despised or feared things called categories.
So let us scan the social sciences.
Colonial colleges from the founding of Harvard to the
revolution were dominated by religious and ethical influ-
ences. From the revolution to the civil war courses in moral
philosophy were common and required. Paley, author of the
most popular text during most of that period said "Moral
philosophy, morality, Ethics, Casuistry, Natural Law, mean
all the same thing: namely, that science which teaches men
their duty and the reasons of it." And "political philosophy
is, properly speaking, a continuation of moral philosophy; or
rather, indeed, a part of it."
The purpose of courses in political theory was ethical and
moral philosophy included ethics, politics and economics.
Burlamaqui and Vattel were the basis of lectures on the law
of nature and of nations. Just before the civil war Francis
Lieber's works appeared, the first American treatises on po-
litical science. 'His object was to show how principles of
ethics are applied to politics. By 1865, however, old-time
texts in moral philosophy had been generally discarded. The
newer texts struck an ethical note but it was rather from the
standpoint of the individual. One writer indicated a new
trend as early as 1841 when he wrote: "Questions as to the
best organization and the best form of society. . . are not so
much questions of duty as of art. They are the object of the
two sciences of politics and political economy, which are
quite distinct from, ethics." Between 1865 and 1900 politic-
al science emerged as a separate discipline. The beginning
of the "secular upheaval" may be assigned to 1869 when
Charles W. Eliot became president of Harvard. In the lat-
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ter half of the century moral philosophy became individual
ethics. During that period interest in politics shifted from
courses in moral philosophy and from classical courses which
had not yet become narrowly linguistic to history, particu-
larly courses in constitutional history. By the late eighties,
however, interest in that subject had definitely failed. The
shift was now to political, economic and social history. Men
were beginning to concentrate on descriptive studies of prac-
tical politics, elections, political corruption, administration,
and local government, and this was being carried on in sep-
arate departments of political science. By the beginning of
the century courses in political science were being given to
large numbers of college and university students because of
increased enrollment and because the subject had been
bpened to the students down to the freshman year. There
was little interest at this' time in political theory; courses
concentrated on "actual government". As in other social sci-
ences aping the physical sciences the method of approach
was empirical, secular, descriptive, analytical; ethics aind
philosophy were avoided as presumably subjective and "un-
scientific."
So in 1927 we find a leading political scientist insisting
that "it is no more the function of the political scientist to
evaluate the good or bad consequences of particular tech-
niques than it is the function of the chemist, qua chemist, to
pass ethical judgments upon the use which other men make
of chemical knowledge and skill." And in the same year the
president of the American Political Science Association in his
presidential address said: "Political science, to become a sci-
ence, should first of all obtain a divorce from the philoso-
phers, the lawyers and the psychologists with whom it has
long been in the status of a polygamous companionate mar-
riage to the detriment of its own quest for truth.... Our im-
mediate goal, therefore, should be to release political science
from the old metaphysical and juristic concepts upon which
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it has traditionally been based.. . . It is to the natural sciences
that we may most profitably turn, in this hour of transition,
for suggestions as to our postulates and methods. Political
science should borrow by analogy from the new physics a
determination to get rid of intellectual insincerities concern-
ing the nature of sovereignty, the general will, natural rights,
and the freedom of the individual, the consent of the gov-
erned, majority rule, home rule, the rule of public opinion,
state rights, laissez faire, checks and balances, the equality
of men and nations, and a government of laws not men."
And today, though not without some challenge, we find
such statements as these by leading political scientists: "It
is not the function of the scientist to judge between 'good'
and 'evil' in his research operations. It is not up to him to
say that political corruption is either good or bad." And "It
is certainly not appropriate in the class-room, particularly at
the college level, to discuss political ideologies in terms of
'better or worse' ". In political science as in other social sci-
ences there are many relativists who contend that there is no
scientific method of determining the superiority of one end
over another. As Arnold Brecht has put it: "There is accord-
ing to relativism no scientific method by which to state, in
non-relative terms, whether man has a specific dignity that
ought always to be respected . . . whether there is a greater
value in peace or in war, in charity or selfishness, in the lib-
eration of slaves or the enslavement of the free, in the goals
of democracy or fascism. Most relativists have insisted that
value judgments are statements not of what is but what
ought to be, and that it is not possible logically to derive a
statement of what ought to be from a statement of what is.
Some have gone so far as to say that sentences dealing with
what ought to be are no statements at all, but merely express
emotional preferences, sentiments regarding one's own be-
havior, or the like."
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The shift from ethical or moral emphasis to positivistic
description and the development of political science as a
separate discipline was paralleled in the field of economics.
It too was originally a part of moral philosophy, but by 182 5
many colleges were giving courses in "political economy".
Towards the end of the century less and less attention was
paid to problems of government and much more to problems
of private business and later departments of economics were
developing into Schools of Business Administration. Though
a relation was recognized between economics and political
science, psychology and history, there was little to philos-
ophy and none to ethics. For thought was concentrated on
the standardized, mythical economic man whose sole motiva-
tion was the pursuit of profit in complete isolation' from obli-
gation to others or to society at large and without regard to
conscience or moral principle. And so far as national econ-
omy was concerned the sole problem was how to strengthen
the state for its own selfish purposes of imperialism or of
power. For the economist like the "scientific" political sci-
entist placed no limits of morality or of natural or higher law
upon the sovereign state. And the teacher of economics like
the political scientist used the descriptive method; he ex-
cluded-any standard but profit or material prosperity; effect-
ed by the evolutionary hypothesis and by changes in institu-
tions and in economic practices revealed by the historian he
often doubted the existence of any economic laws that were
more than tentative assertions of the probable. As Harold
G. Moulton of the Brookings Institute puts it: "A phrase-
the relativity of economic thought-has been developed to
indicate the necessity of an evolutionary body of economic
thought paralleling evolutionary changes in the economic
system."
Evolutionary theory, particularly the struggle for exist-
ence, dominated the thought of teachers of economics gen-
erally in the United States during the exploitive period of
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business expansion that followed the civil war. It was especi-
ally congenial to the individualistic entrepeneur. John D.
Rockefeller in a Sunday-school address said: "The growth
of a large business is merely the survival of the fittest....
The American Beauty rose can be produced in the splendor
and fragrance which bring cheer to its beholder only by sac-
rificing the early buds which grow up around it. This is not
an evil tendency in business. It is merely the working out
of a law of nature and a law of God." Rockefeller was mere-
ly expressing a generally-held opinion widely popularized
through the immense sales of Herbert Spencer's books which
reached their greatest influence about the early eighties. Wil-
liam Graham Sumner with a "wider following than any other
teacher in -Yale's history," provided his age with a "synthesis
of the protestant ethic," of success as the reward of virtue,
the laissez-faire doctrines of classical economics, and a com-
bination of Ricardian principles of inevitability with evolu-
tionary scientific determinism. Rights, according to Sum-
ner were simply evolving folkways, not representative of ab-
solute antecedent principles but merely currently adopted
rules of the competitive game.
The close relation between Darwinism and pragmatism
was paralleled among economists. It was one of their lead-
ers, Thomas Nixon Carver, who preached the doctrine, in a
book The Religion Worth Having, that "the naturally se-
lected are the chosen of God," and that the best religion is
that which "acts most powerfully as a spur to energy and di-
rects that energy most productively."
It was not strange that sociology, deriving its name and
the inspiration for its separate discipline from the founder
of positivism should, under Spencer's leadership, consider
society in evolutionary biological tezims. If the life of so-
ciety, progress upward and onward, did not depend upon the
ruthless struggle of individuals subject only to the jungle law
of nature red in tooth and claw, it was the struggle of groups:
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biological, round-headed, long-headed, supposedly racial.
And later, sociology like all the social sciences was profound-
ly influenced by the development of modern psychology, par-
ticularly crowd psychology. But before we come to that
let us briefly consider history and anthropology.
In 1834 the first volume of German-trained George Ban-
croft's History of the United States with its prefatory em-
phasis upon indefatigable research, reliance upon primary
sources alone, skeptical insistence upon authenticity, fore-
shadowed the era of later nineteenth century American his-
tory. In that period, under the influence of German scholar-
ship and imported seminar methods, the panoranic literary
histories of Prescott, Motley and Parkman were replaced by
a constantly increasing flood of highly specialized, mono-
graphic studies where generalizations were scrupulously
avoided in preference for detailed specific facts. Anything
savoring of a philosophy of history was anathema, and in
the interest of objective scientific truth thought and expres-
sion were carefully immunized against any contamination by
ethical or moral judgments. There were no such things as
laws of history, synthesis was rare and even the emotional
appeal of a literary style was viewed with suspicion as indi-
cating subjectivity or bias. Aridity proved validity. Cul-
tural histories stressed the constant change in institutions
and in concepts. Economic determinism reenforced by the
spread of Marxism emphasized the non-rational self-interest
class struggle aspects of the human story. It is not without
significance, as Eliot has pointed out, that Beard in his
Economic Interpretation of the Constitutiom of the United
States quoted Pascal: "The will, the imagination, the dis-
orders of the body, the thousand concealed infirmities of the
intelligence conspire to' reduce our discovery of justice and
truth to a process of haphazard in which we more often miss
than hit the mark." So Bryce wrote: "As regards large parts
of every public that may be said which the old statesman
I
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said to his son in Disraeli's Contarini Fleming, 'Few ideas
are correct ones, and what are correct no one can ascertain'."
As to anthropology, the study of man as a social being was
inevitably revolutionized by the evolutionary hypothesis.
The theory that man evolved from the anthropoid ape em-
phasized his kinship with the animal world from which he
had been separated ever since the days of Aristotle as a
uniquely rational being. It gave great impetus to the study
of animals in both their individual and associated activities:
how insects, birds, and mammals build shelters, store food;
ants cultivate fungi; apes use sticks and stones as tools; di-
vision of labor, property rights asserted by individuals and
by animal societies; mutual aid as a factor in evolution;
primitive cultures; changes in environment as changing cus-
toms and beliefs; ethical systems and religions as products of
their age and as developments of primitive myths, supersti-
tions and customs, tribal rituals, fetishes, tabus, animism.
Here were flux, interminable change, absence of eternal veri-
ties and enduring standards, individual animal instincts and
desires and the will of the tribe institutionalized and ration-
alized. But with the mask snatched off by the "scientific"
anthropologist man individually and collectively was ines-
capably neanderthal or piltdown, indeed brother to the ox.
We cannot linger on psychology which became increasing-
ly biological, experimental, materialistic, functional, non-
philosophical, behavioristic, Freudian, anti-intellectualist.
Just as Darwinism lent itself admirably to facile picturesque
popularization, so the new psychology was widely publicised
to the masses who soon glibly attributed-the conduct of man
whether prize-fighter or supreme court justice, not to prin-
ciples or reason, but to external stimuli, visceral reactions,
complexes, suppressed desires, long-forgotten infantile frus-
trations. Social psychology, although coming into recognition
as a distinct social science in the last decade of the nine-
teenth century had its roots as far back as Protagoras with
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his insistence upon public opinion rather than natural law as
determining what men consider right. Bagehot's Physics
and Politics anticipated Tarde, Le Bon and at the turn of
the century, E. A. Ross. More and more individual thought
was regarded as ,the product of stimuli arising from social or
collective situations; from the pressure of mob emotion, of
changing and irrational mass opinions. Graham Wallas's
Human Nature in Politics, published in 1908 had wide in-
fluence with his warning: "Away with the intellectualist fal-
lacy; politics is only in a slight degree the product of con-
scious reason; it is largely a matter of subconscious processes
of habit and instinct, suggestion and imitation. . . . Man, like
other animals, lives in an unending stream of sense impres-
sions."
James Harvey Robinson's The Mind in the Making ap-
peared in 1921 and had a wide popular appeal. Who can cal-
culate the effects of such statements as these made with all
the eclat of modern scientific truth: "Our convictions on im-
portant matters are not -the result of knowledge or of critical
thought... . They are whisperings of 'the voice of the herd'
... No... mind, exempt from bodily processes, animal im-
pulses, savage traditions, infantile impressions, conventional
reactions, and traditional knowledge ever existed.. . . The
progress of mankind in the scientific knowledge and regula-
tion of human affairs has remained almost stationary for
over two thousand years.... And how, indeed, as descend-
ants of an extinct race of primates, with a mind still in the
early stages of accumulation, should we be in the way of
reaching ultimate truth at any point? . . . I am inclined to
rate metaphysics, like smoking, as a highly gratifying indul-
gence to those who like it, and, as indulgences go, relatively
innocent . . . Plato ascribed the highest form of existence to
ideals and abstractions. This was a new and sophisticated
republication of savage animism .... The modern 'principle'
is too often only a new form of the ancient taboo .... The
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reliance on authority is a fundamental primitive trait....
We are... still animals with not only an animal body, but
an animal mind. The sharp distinction between the mind
and the body is... a very ancient and spontaneous uncritical
savage prepossession .... Language is not primarily a ve-
hicle of ideas and information, but an emotional outlet, cor-
responding to various cooings, growlings, snarls, crowings,
and brayings."
But perhap.s; the greatest breach in the wall of human
faith in reason was made by the widespread promulgation by
Robinson and others of the doctrine of rationalization, de-
rived according to Dewey from the abnormal psychology of
the insane. Here as in other instances a valid caution was
carried to exaggeration inconsistent with truth. Said Robin-
son: "Most of our so-called reasoning consists in finding arg-
uments for going on believing as we already do .... The 'real'
reasons for our beliefs are concealed from ourselves as well as
from others. . .. We unconsciously absorb them from our
environment .... Our 'good' reasons are at bottom the result
of personal preference or prejudice. Rationalizing is the
self-exculpation which occurs when we feel ourselves or our
group accused of misapprehension or error. And now the
astonishing and perturbing suspicion emerges that perhaps
almost all that has passed for social science, political econ-
omy, politics and ethics in the past may be brushed aside by
future generations as mainly rationalizing. John Dewey has
already reached this conclusion as to philosophy. So the so-
cial sciences have continued even to our own day to be ra-
tionalizations of uncritically accepted beliefs and customs."
Falling in the backwash of cynicism that followed World
War I, contributing to and coinciding with a wave of de-
bunking biographies and- an era of critical realism, of-ten
utter and gutter, in literature and the arts and on the stage,
a revolt against standards and a reversion to the unintellig-
ible, animalistic yawp of the primitive and the jungle; this
too furthered the attack on reason.
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The philosophy of the schools was also influenced by mod-
ern psychology, anthropology, history, particularly cultural
history, comparative poltical science and comparative ethics.
Without depreciating the hard thinking and sincerity of
teachers .of secular philosophy in general, I content myself
with adopting the phrase that philosophy courses are often
a species of kaleidoscopic entertainment leading only to con-
fusion. Indeed in one great American university the an-
nounced purpose of a textbook in modern philosophy was to
leave the reader or student in a state of profound confusion.
As Father G. Stuart Hogan has said: "In modern secular
education, philosophy, if taught at all, assumes the form of
an exposition or history of the various systems of philosophic
thought, ancient and modern, rather than a scientific attempt
to determine philosophic truth, or to establish a true philo-
sophic-religious system of thought. In most of our secular
institutions of higher learning philosophy has become a
rather unimportant elective subject. To many college grad-
uates, or even college professors ... at most.., it is a study
of man's opinions and conflicting views (most of which are
not worth the paper they are written on.)"
Turning from philosophy to legal education we find that
down to the end of the civil war courses in departments or
schools of law generally had the Blackstonian ideal of edu-
cating the gentleman rather than giving specifically voca-
tional training for the lawyer. But with the increasing flood
of judicial decisions there was a shift from lectures on the
law of nature and of nations and philosophically jurispru-
dential subjects to technical analytical studies of specifically
American law. Ideas of specialization, of concentrating on
facts with scientific objectivity as in the social sciences to the
avoidance of the philosophical and the ethical came to domi-
nate legal education in America. The great turning point
was, of course, the institution of the case system by Langdell
at Harvard in 1870. It was based on the assumption that
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the law could be taught inductively. For a long period in
American law schools it was used without any reference to
philosophy, administered to students often without philo-
sophical training or education in general ideas, dominated
by the conceptions of a mechanistic Austinian jurisprudence
according to which positive law was a self-sufficient sciencq
having no relation to the social sciences, utterly divorced
from ethics and from natural law. The problem for many
years was merely to find out what the law was; sole concern
was with the "is," none, at least systematically, with the
"ought". The curriculum and spirit of legal education were
intensely practical; teacher and student concentrated, as
James would say, on the "cash value" of ideas, not on the-
ories or abstractions. Courses of no immediate use to the
private practitioner such as legal history, comparative law,
Roman or civil law and legal philosophy generally disappear-
ed, or here and there anemically survived as electives-
relegated to the cellar or the closet along with legal ethics.
And that subject generally consisted merely of a hasty defer-
ential bow to Sharswood or bar association canons of ethics
that were courtesies of the trade rather than principles with
any solid philosophical or reasoned ethical basis.
Thus the whole sweep of thought in political science, eco-
nomics, sociology, anthropology, history, psychology, phil-
osophy, and in legal education during the last one hundred
years was in the direction of relativism, positivism, empiric-
ism, concentration on concrete measurable facts and the an-
alysis of narrowly circumscribed situations by specialists
using their own highly specialized techniques. The emphasis
was on change rather than stability, on the temporal and im-
mediate rather than the eternal, on the natural to the exclu-
sion of the supernatural. There was distrust -of synthesis
and of metaphysics, disregard of ontology, suspicion of phil-
osophy.
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To the relativity of the social sciences was added a confu-
sion resulting from profound changes in the physical sciences
during -the latter part of the last one hundred years. These
changes were particularly disturbing to those who had turned
from religion to dogmatic materialistic sdience as their god
or had hoped that an integrated philosophy would emerge
from facts produced by the inductive sciences as soon as
there were facts enough. It was seen that the physical sci-
ences had their own basic assumptions, previously unchal-
lenged. The solid matter of Newtonian physics was replaced
by something wavelike. "Fixed measures, constant rules be-
came ambiguous. Bodies could be two sizes at the same
time, straight lines contemporaneously crooked." It was
discovered that "the assumptions of classical physics were
not universal necessities of nature, but only somewhat paro-
chial principles of analysis suitable for handling a limited
type of material." Causality was doubted. Whitehead said:
"The stable foundations of physics have broken up .... The
old foundations of scientific thought are becoming unintell-
igible. Time, space, matter, material, ether, function, elec-
tricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, structure, pat-
tern, all require reinterpretation." There was reason for
Dewey saying: "If reality itself be in transition. .. this doc-
trine originated not with the objectionable pragmatist, but
with the physicist and naturalist and moral historian."
Thus it is certain that the whole climate of opinion, both
educational and popular, was favorable to the seeds of prag-
matism.
We recognize, of course, that the roots of pragmatism go
back to the Sophists. We recognize the fact that the temper
of thought in the United States was akin to that which domi-
nated European thought during the last century and that
pragmatism is not an exclusively American invention flower-
ing only on American soil. Nevertheless pragmatism made a
particularly strong appeal to the American mind. As de
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Tocqueville said: "To evade the bondage of system and
habit, of family-maxims, class opinions, and, in some degree,
of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means
of information, and existing facts only as a lesson to be used
in doing otherwise and doing better; to seek the reason of
things for one's self, and in one's self alone; to tend to re-
sults without being bound to means, and to aim at the sub-
stance through the form;-such are the principal character-
istics of what I shall call the philosophical methods of the
Americans."
Pragmatism was practical. So was the American. Like
the frontiersman and the man of business it tended to scorn
theory; there" was condemnation in the word "theoretical".
Both glorified action at the expense of reflection; efficiency
was their god. Both emphasized short-term visible, tangible
results rather than long-term eventualities, distrusted the ab-
stract, preferred concrete and definite facts that could be
weighed, measured, counted, and banked; looked to the fu-
ture rather than the past. As de Tocqueville noted in his
diary: "There is no country in the world where man more
confidently seizes the future." Or as Bliss Perry put it:
"Here in America everything was to do; we were forced to
conjugate our verbs in the future tense." So too the logic
of both looked to consequences rather than to premises.
They were of the "restless temper" that the Frenchman also
noted. "The American," he said, "has no time to tie him-
self to anything, he grows accustomed only to change, and
ends by regarding it as the natural state of man. He feels
the need of it, more, he loves it; for the instability, instead
of meaning disaster to him- seems to give birth only to mir-
acles about him." Both pragmatism and the American were
ex tempore, particularly valued the expedient, were generally
inclined to regard differences of principle as merely verbal
and of no great consequence unless something momentous
was visibly at stake, distrustful of what they called dogma.
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Both pragmatism and the American were individualistic,
anti-authoritarian, proud of the right of private judgment,
equalitarian in that one man's opinion was as good as an-
other's. Both were materialistic, prided themselves on what
they called their tough, hard realism but nevertheless were
sentimental and often idealistic-provided that the ideals
were sufficiently vague.
Rousseau and romanticism are seen in both. The ineradic-
able moral sentiments of man, vestigial remnants of trans-
cendentalism, secularized protestantism and humanitarian
impulses derived from the Christian ethic and impelling even
those avowedly agnostic, skeptic-or materialist, were capital-
ized and canalized into the support of secular education. By
concentrating on pedagogical methods and on material equip-
ment, on means and organization, the divisive effect of any
conscious or unconscious disagreement as to the essential"
nature of man and the ultimate end of the educational pro-
cess was avoided. As religious faith weakened and dogmatic
science of the late nineteenth century was seen to be a false
god, more and more earnest men and women made public
education their non-sectarian, non-credal, intensely practical
and tangible religion. As a leading pragmatist said, the
teacher's desk became an altar. And John Dewey was the
prophet of the new religion which was fused into a worship
of democracy that rapidly won adherents. Ethics and truth
were man-made, instruments of an anthropological human-
ism, expressions of the general will in which each man mys-
tically participated. As Kallen says: "For Dewey growth is
intelligence, intelligence is freedom, freedom is education, ed-
ucation is growth." Education plus government of 'a social-
istic type would enable men to work together with a sense
of unity and to achieve their ideals. The ideals, however,
were not stated any more than the objective of the "growth"
which was education. The big thing was shared experience
and "this active relation between the ideal and the actual"
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to which Dewey gave the name "God". God, he said, is
simply "the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and
actions."
In 1888 Dewey had written: "Democracy and the one, the
ultimate ethical ideal of humanity are to my mind synony-
mous. The idea of democracy, the ideas of liberty, equality,
and fraternity, represent a society in which the distinction
between the spiritual and the secular has ceased . . . the
church and the state, the divine and the human organization
of society are one." Forty-six years later hedefined religious
faith, not as belief in a supernatural deity nor in values
transcending human life, but as "the unification of self
through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination
presents to us and to which the human will responds as
worthy of controlling our desires and choices." Evidently
the "inclusive ideal ends" whatever they might from time
to time turn out transiently to be, were to be determined or
sought for in a democratic educational system whose only
philosophy--if it be a philosophy-was to be pragmatism.
And the pragmatism was to be democratic in a democracy in
which, according to Dewey, "the governed and the governors
are not two classes, but two aspects of the same fact-the
fact of the possession by society of a unified and articulate
will."
Here once again is the sovereign general will of Rousseau,
sentimental, anti-intellectual, making its own standards to
suit the desires of the transient hour, taking expediency as its
guide, restrained by no objective standards or by recognition
of any higher law than force and the will to power. Cer-
tainly to the pragmatist there was to be no restraint of nat-
ural law.
And here at the last I mention natural law. But I have
done this purposely. For I need not point out how difficult
it would be for natural law with its basis in absolutes, in
reason, in eternal unchanging verities, to withstand the ero-
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sion of this philosophical and cultural environment. What
interest could there be in scholastic natural law, in true nat-
ural law, among a generation of materialists as Carleton
Hayes called the men of 1870 to 1900, men of a sensate cul-
ture as Sorokin described those of this age, among men con-
temptuous of tradition Whose scorn of the medieval was
matched only by their ignorance of the accomplishments of
the medieval mind? They were repelled also from what
they thought was natural law by two brands of pseudo-
natural law. First, that represented by the excessively the-
oretical and abstract creations of the French revolutionary
mind with its succession of paper constitutions echoed by the
closet-spun codes of Bentham. Second, the Spencerian iden-
tification of natural law with the brute struggle for existence
and individualistic, atomistic laissez-faire. Indeed it was
the humanitarian revulsion at abuses of the capitalistic sys-
tem run riot and proletarian protest that brought into being
the progressive movement of the first part of this century.
Pragmatism was a powerful weapon against the status quo
and it is not without significance that so many leaders of the
movement were pragmatists. More and more they called
upon the state for aid; for control of economic processes,
often without too much thought as to the dangers of a totali-
tarian trend. This was the paradox of liberalism.
Liberalism in the law had certain salutary effects which no
one of sense would deny any more than he would assert
that all of pragmatism was evil. But the evil effects of prag-
matism and its offspring legal realism were clear: the intro-
duction of what to many was regarded as an unwise and un-
necessary disregard of stare decisi and too wide a degree of
judicial discretion, indeed the conversion of the judge too
often into a legislator in constitutional cases. But most dan-
gerous of all was the unsettling of the philosophical bases of
the law. These evil effects I know you know because of the
clear and trenchant criticisms of legal pragmatism by such
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scholastics as Francis Lucey, S.J., John C. Ford, S.J., William
H. Kenealy, S.J., R. W. Mulligan, S.J., Msgr. William Dillon,
Clarence Manion, Brendan F. Brown, the late Walter B.
Kennedy, and Miriam Theresa Rooney. Nor shall I here dis-
cuss the profound influence of Mr. Justice Holmes because of
his skillful use of his long-occupied key position on the Su-
preme Court, because of his intellectual power, the prestige
of his name, and the felicities of a style sufficient to deceive
even the elect. So also I shall not pause here to refer to some
return of philosophy to the law schools, the growing discon-
tent with pragmatic secular education, with a science that has
created a Frankenstein monster which threatens to destroy
us and which gives us neither assurance, nor hope, nor wis-
dom. But if anything is becoming clear to this confused
revolutionary generation when the foundations of civiliza-
tion are shaken to the depths, it is that the law like life needs
an integrating philosophy that will give some objective stan-
dards, some sure footing amidst the shifting sands of crumb-
ling secular institutions.
You and I know that the answei lies in the further invig-
oration and wider acceptance of scholastic natural law; that
natural law which represents the experienced reason of men
of many races, tongues and cultures since far before the birth
of Christ; that natural law whose achievements for fifteen
centuries the Carlyles have traced, to which Coke and our
revolutionary forefathers appealed, and which for the
Founding Fathers was the one sure basis of constitutional
liberty in America, indeed in any land at any time.
One hundred and forty million men and women, each
unique and infinitely precious in the eyes of God, seek refuge
in the temple of American law. They look for protection
against the abuses of arbitrary power whether by individ-
uals, ruthless minority groups, or by the clamorous majority
in a vast continental democracy. If they find that the
foundations of that structure have been subtly undermined
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so that it no longer gives them assurance of protection; if
they see with newly-opened eyes that the law administered
therein is merely the embodiment of arbitrary force, of com-
mand and not of reason or enduring principles of justice, they
will shatter it to bits and revert to primeval chaos or insur-
rection organized. And that catastrophe will occur if a prag-
matic philosophy dominates the law, particularly American
constitutional law. For, the basic philosophy of the Consti-
tution gone, only an empty shell of verbiage remains., That
discovered, the public opinion which supports the law, the
Constitution and the courts, will turn against them for their
mockery of justice and seek other gods-perhaps the gods of
force.
Ben W. Palmer
